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The Peak Oil Debate
Laurel Graefe*
For the past half-century, a debate has raged over when “peak oil” will occur—the 
point at which output can no longer increase and production begins to level off or 
gradually decline. Determining how long the oil supply will last has become even 
more pressing because the world’s energy supply still relies heavily on oil, and 
global energy demand is expected to rise steeply over the next twenty years.
This article seeks to bring the peak oil debate into focus. The author notes 
that a number of factors cloud the energy outlook: Estimates of remaining 
resources are typically given as a range of probabilities and are thus open to  
interpretation. Variations also occur in estimates of future oil production and  
in the ways countries report their reserve data. 
The lack of a common definitional framework also confuses the debate. The 
author provides definitions of frequently used terms, delineating types of reserves 
and conventional versus nonconventional resources. She also discusses how tech-
nological innovations, government policies, and prices influence oil production. 
Regardless of the exact timing of peak oil production, the world must address 
the challenge of adapting to a new model of energy supply. Perhaps the world 
would be better served, the author notes, if the peak oil debate could be more  
solution-oriented, focusing on discovering the best way to transition to a world with 
less conventional oil rather than locking horns about discrepancies in terminology.
JEL classification: Q40, Q41
Key words: peak oil, oil supply, oil prices, conventional reserves, Hotelling
* The author is a senior economic research analyst in the Atlanta Fed’s research department.1
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T
he debate about when the world will reach peak oil production is not a new one. But recently, 
as the price of crude oil has been unusually volatile, the issue of peak production has received 
heightened attention in the media, and the tone has changed in the discussions among oil industry 
and energy watchdogs about the future of global oil supply.
The term “peak oil” is not about running out of oil; we will likely have oil to pump for generations 
to come. Peak oil refers instead to the inevitable point at which the world’s energy output can no 
longer increase, and production begins to level off or decline. At first glance this issue would 
not appear to be controversial. After all, it is largely a question of geology—how much oil is left? 
The disagreements center around basic aboveground supply-side constraints and demand-side 
factors. On the supply side, how much will oil companies invest in capacity? How will extraction 
and refining technology advance? Or how many hurricanes or wars will occur in oil-producing 
regions? On the demand side, how fast will global economic growth be? (See the sidebar on   
page 4.) What impact will future environmental policies have on oil consumption? 
One may wonder what makes oil so special; why don’t we think of oil just like other physical 
nonrenewable commodities? You don’t often hear of debates on the timing of the demise of gold, 
or diamonds, or zinc. So what’s the fuss about?
Countless numbers of popular books, papers, and blogs are fully committed to either proving 
or debunking the theory that world oil production either already has peaked or will peak soon. Merely 
entering a discussion about peak oil can prove to be rather sticky, given the heated, often apocalyptic 
aspect of the debate. The sense that the peak oil argument tends to be fear-based often plays to 
people’s emotions, adding more fervor to the dispute.
What is fascinating is how little the two sides of the argument have changed over the history 
of the debate. People have been calling for the beginning of the end of oil for more than half 
the past century. (Keep in mind that the industrial use of oil began only about 100 years ago.1) 
Those who announce that the world is about to reach (or has already reached) peak always have 
counterparts who disagree. The nonbelievers had yet another victory in early 2009 when the 
2008 production figures were released, showing that annual oil production increased to a record 
high in 2008, dismissing an increasingly popular prediction that world oil output had peaked in 
2005 (see figure 1). The doomsayers, of course, must eventually be right—given the fact that 
oil is an exhaustible resource and will ultimately run out—though they haven’t been right so far. 
But the counterargument that oil production hasn’t peaked yet, so it isn’t going to, doesn’t prove 
terribly convincing.
Despite the shortage of middle-of-the-road discourse, this topic should not be dismissed as 
fringe. Figure 2 demonstrates how, despite the increasing use of nonpetroleum resources such 
as natural gas and renewables, the world still relies heavily on oil for a considerable portion of 
its energy supply. In fact, in its International Energy Outlook 2009, the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) projects that world energy demand will grow by nearly 45 percent between 
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2006 and 2030, with about a fifth of new supply needing to come from oil (EIA 2009a, 1, 22). 
Clearly then, having a better understanding of the future oil supply situation and the associated 
risks is a major global issue today and will remain a central concern for the short, medium, and 
long term.
How much is left?
Experts tend to agree that oil production—whether for an individual field, a country, or the world 
as a whole—more or less follows a bell curve. What is more ambiguous is the exact shape and 
asymmetry of the curve: Will production taper off slowly once production peaks, or will it undulate 
steadily for many years, or will it drop off steeply? The topic becomes even more divisive when an 
effort is made to pinpoint how far along the curve global production is today and the level at which 
the world will peak in the future. Most of the debate lies in the fuzzy nature of information at the 
margin. (See the sidebar on page 7.)
A  number  of  unknowns  cloud  the  energy  outlook  and  foster  flexible  interpretations  of   
the supply data that are available. First, the world’s oil resources are often found deep below the 
earth’s surface, making even the best estimates susceptible to large revisions. Official estimates 
of remaining resources rarely come in the form of one concrete number but rather as a range   
of different estimates that are each assigned a probability. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)   
(a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Interior), for example, estimates with 95 percent certainty 
that the world’s undiscovered conventional petroleum is at least 0.4 trillion barrels and with   
5 percent certainty that undiscovered resources are at least 1.2 trillion barrels, with the mean 
estimate at 0.7 trillion barrels undiscovered (USGS 2000, table AR-1). These statistics are therefore 
open to interpretation and, depending on how they are analyzed, can be used on either side of the 
debate to prove a point. The same variation occurs in estimates of how much of the earth’s oil 
resources will actually come into production; some analysts consider only “proved reserves,” or 





























































World crude oil production
Note: Data include extra-heavy crude, lease condensate, and liquids processed from Canadian oil sands. Natural gas liquids are excluded.  
Source: EIA (2009b)
1. Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) (2006) calculates that the current era marks the fifth time that peak 
theorists have claimed the world is running out of oil, and each time technology and the opening of new frontier areas 
have dismissed assertions of a decline.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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reserves with a lower probability of coming into production. Still others focus on entirely different 
indicators of the earth’s remaining resources.2
Another factor that obscures the outlook for oil supply is that individual countries take different 
approaches to sharing their reserve data. For instance, while the U.S. policy is to publically share 
its reserve estimates, Saudi Arabia, the country thought to have the largest petroleum holdings on 
earth, maintains a high level of secrecy about its reserves. This practice provokes skepticism about 
whether the disclosed quantity of reserves is somehow politically or otherwise motivated. 
In addition, the fact that production estimates must rely heavily on assumptions about factors 
that tend to be difficult to predict, such as the state of technology, the economy, the environment, 
geopolitics, and so on, leaves even more room for guesswork and bias.
Fortunately, most of the studies of peak oil recognize similar players and consider similar risks. 
Where the controversy arises is that some articles cite similar dynamics and statistics only to reach 
opposing conclusions. The peak oil discussion would become much clearer if the terminology were 
more uniform; simple analytical mix-ups can lead to large discrepancies in estimates.3
Definitions of remaining resource types
While measuring the world’s existing oil and forecasting the rate of extraction is already a complex 
matter, the lack of a common definitional framework adds more confusion. This section provides 
definitions of selected terms that are often used—and often used in a fast and loose way.
Types of reserves. Proved reserves, commonly labeled 1P, consist of the reserves “reasonably 
likely” to be producible using current technology at current prices, with current commercial terms 
2. Bentley, Mannan, and Wheeler (2007) make a case for analyzing peak oil production using estimates of proved plus 
probable reserves (2P) instead of considering only proved reserves. CERA (2006) and Kovarik (2003) contend that 
scientists should be looking at estimates of total global resources, arguing that production capacity will rise well beyond 
today’s measures of proved reserves, led by technological advancement, resource discovery, and increasing production 
of unconventional resources.
3. Sweetnam (2008) identifies several steps that could remove some of the guesswork from analysis of future oil supply, 
including gaining a better understanding of future technology on costs and maximum recovery factors, improving 
knowledge of the drivers of long-term oil demand, and developing an agreed-on terminology to more clearly distinguish 
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World energy consumption by energy type
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and government consent. While “reasonably likely” can be interpreted in more than one way, the 
most common is reserves with a 90 percent probability of being produced, or P90. However, when 
reserve figures are quoted, they are commonly referred to only as “proved” without specifying the 
estimated probability of production (P95, P90, or some other percentage). 
Proved reserves are subdivided into “proved developed,” which can be produced with existing 
wells and perforations or reservoirs where minimal additional investment is required, and “proved 
undeveloped,”  which  require  additional  capital  investment  (drilling  new  wells,  installing  gas 
compression, etc.) to bring the oil and gas to the surface.
Probable reserves are those that are “reasonably probable” to be produced using current or 
likely technology at current prices, with current commercial terms and government consent.4 
Probable reserves are usually considered at the median of the distribution function, or P50. They 
are also known as 2P, or proved plus probable reserves. 
I
n 2005 energy consumption in emerging and 
developing  economies  (countries  that  are 
not members of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD]) exceeded 
consumption in developed (OECD) countries 
for  the  first  time  in  history  (International 
Energy Agency [IEA] and OECD 2008). Much 
of the increase in energy demand in the next 
few decades is expected to continue to come 
from  non-OECD  countries  as  they  further 
develop their industrial sectors and support the 
emergence of an urban middle class. According 
to the IEA, if current policies remain in place, 
the world’s primary energy needs will be nearly 
50 percent higher in 2030 than they were in 
2006, with non-OECD countries accounting for 
more than 85 percent of the increase.
The figure shows historical demand and the 
IEA’s baseline forecast for global energy demand 
through 2030. Combined energy consumption 
in  China  and  India,  which  represented  only 
about 10 percent of the world’s total energy 
use in 1980, is expected to account for nearly a 
third of the total in 2030. 
Sidebar 1
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Source:  IEA and OECD (2008)
4. Notice how measures of proved and probable reserves are directly associated with current or likely technology and 
policy, making estimates highly susceptible to large revisions based on these aboveground, nongeologic factors, which 
can vary significantly in a short period of time.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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People have been calling for the 
beginning of the end of oil for more 
than half the past century.
Possible reserves are those having a chance of being developed under favorable circumstances—
typically, those with a 10 percent certainty of being produced, or P10. In the industry, possible 
resources are often referred to as 3P, signifying proved plus probable plus possible reserves. 
While these definitions are in theory somewhat clear-cut, in practice statistics on global oil 
reserves are not so straightforward because there is no transparent or audited internationally 
agreed-upon procedure for reporting reserves. Confusion can arise as different countries and 
companies often report only “reserves,” without distinguishing which type (and therefore with 
how much certainty) they are reporting.
Conventional versus nonconventional sources. An important distinction between the 
different types of reserves is that between conventional and unconventional hydrocarbons.5 In 
general,  whether  a  deposit  is  considered  conventional  is 
determined  by  the  difficulty  involved  in  extracting  and 
producing the resource. There are two primary methods of 
classification—one economic and one geological.
In economic terms, conventional oil is oil that can be 
extracted  and  produced  under  existing  (or  foreseeable) 
technological  and  economic  conditions.  Nonconventional  resources  are  those  that  are  more 
difficult and expensive to put into production. Note that while this classification provides a valuable 
concept, it describes a moving target (and just as with proved reserves, the estimate will change 
over time as technology advances) and involves a good deal of speculation about future economic 
circumstances and technological evolution.
The more precise, geological definition from the USGS differentiates between conventional 
and nonconventional oil on the basis of petroleum’s density (API gravity) and resistance to flow 
(viscosity). According to Meyer and Attanasi (2003), the USGS defines conventional (light) oil as 
having an API gravity of at least 22° and a viscosity less than 11cP (a higher API gravity and lower 
viscosity indicate a less dense, thinner liquid).6
Nonconventional (heavy) oil is then loosely defined as any petroleum liquid having less than 
22° API gravity. Nonconventional oil includes extra-heavy oil, with less than 10° API and a viscosity 
below 10,000cP. Nearly all of the world’s discovered extra-heavy oil is located in Venezuela’s 
Orinoco Oil Belt.
Oil sands, also referred to as natural bitumen or tar sands, are a denser, thicker version of 
heavy oil, with an API gravity below 10° and a viscosity greater than 10,000 cP. At present, the only 
large-scale commercial oil sands production takes place in Canada’s Alberta oil sands region, home 
to 70 percent of the world’s total discovered bitumen resources.7
Figure 3 shows the estimated volume of the world’s conventional oil reserves as well as heavy 
oil and oil sands petroleum resources deemed by the USGS to be technically (but not necessarily 
commercially) recoverable given currently available technology and industry practices. Although 
the combined amount of nonconventional resources actually exceeds the quantity of conventional 
oil reserves, nonconventional liquids accounted for only about three billion barrels (less than   
4 percent) of the 85 billion barrels of oil produced in 2006 (EIA 2009a, 22).
5. Much of the uncertainty regarding peak oil outcomes stems from experts’ differing opinions about the ability of large-
scale nonconventional resource projects to produce at a rate necessary to both keep up with rising demand and replace 
conventional liquids production.
6. About three-quarters of the earth’s conventional oil resources are located in just a handful of giant oil fields, representing 
only about 1 percent of the number of the world’s oil fields (Gerling 2007). 
API gravity measures how heavy or light the liquid is. An API gravity greater than 10° indicates that the oil is light 
enough to float on water; petroleum with a gravity of less than 10° is heavier and will sink. 
Centipoise (cP) is the unit of measurement for viscosity, or resistance to flow. Water at 70°F has a viscosity of about 
one cP.
7. The volume of discovered original oil in Canada totals just under 1.7 trillion barrels. However, only about 10.5 percent of 
that (179 billion barrels) was classified as technically recoverable in 2005 (Meyer and Attanasi 2007).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Other  nonconventional  resources.  Some  other  oil  resources  are  often  categorized  as 
nonconventional, depending on whether a study is defining oil by its physical attributes or its 
economic viability (Lepez 2007, 103–7; Schindler and Zittel 2008, 20–22).
Oil  shale  is  created  at  heavy  industrial  installations  that  process  kerogen  (intermediate 
organic compounds found in certain types of sedimentary rock) at extremely high temperatures. 
Most of the world’s shale (about 1.5 trillion barrels) is located in the western United States, notably 
Colorado and Utah. According to Dyni (2006), the USGS estimates that the world’s total shale oil 
resource is equivalent to about 2.8 trillion barrels of oil; however, little of that total is considered 
to be recoverable under current conditions given the high economic and environmental costs 
associated with oil shale production today.
Deepwater petroleum is found beneath up to 500 meters of water; ultradeep oil is found at 
water depths as great as 2,000 meters. Although deepwater reservoirs tend to be geologically 
similar to those found in shallower areas or onshore, producing oil from such water depths presents 
extensive logistical and technological challenges.
Synthetic oil is liquid fuel created by chemically converting natural gas (gas-to-liquids), coal 
(coal-to-liquids), or biomass, but the process is generally very expensive.
Polar oil resources are those located north of the Arctic Circle and south of the Antarctic 
Circle. Challenges are posed by the extreme climate and remote locations. In a 2008 assessment 
of oil resources in the Arctic Circle, the USGS (2008) estimates that the area holds some 90 billion 
barrels of undiscovered oil.8 The study notes that the majority of these resources are located 
offshore, adding that “the extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically 
largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on earth.”
Natural  gas  liquids  (NGLs),  liquid  components  of  natural  gas,  are  often  included  in 
nonconventional oil estimates. NGLs include condensate (low vapor pressure), natural gasoline 
(intermediate vapor pressure), and liquefied petroleum gas (high vapor pressure).
Figure 3
World's known recoverable petroleum resources (billions of barrels)
Recoverable heavy oil
resources, 434
Recoverable oil sands 
resources, 651
Conventional oil reserves, 952
Figure 3
World’s known recoverable petroleum resources (billions of barrels)
Source: U.S. Geological Survey (2003)
8. In addition to oil deposits, the study also identified 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural 
gas liquids located north of the Arctic Circle.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 2, 2009 7
Extracting  and  refining  these  nonconventional  energy  resources  tends  to  be  much  more 
capital- and energy-intensive than for conventional oil, making them more expensive to produce 
than conventional sources. And given the relatively high environmental impact of processing 
nonconventional  resources,  legislation  restricting  or  taxing  their  use  often  further  increases 
production costs. 
Still,  despite  their  drawbacks,  nonconventional  resources  will  likely  play  an  increasingly 
important marginal supply role in the future as reserves that are easier and cheaper to produce 
T
he  time  at  which  peak  oil  production 
will occur is determined not only by the 
amount  of  resources  that  exist  underground 
and the portion of those resources that can be 
extracted but also by future oil demand, which 
will govern the speed at which the extractable 
resources  are  depleted.  While  estimates  of 
the  earth’s  total  resource  endowment  are 
primarily concerned with physical belowground 
conditions,  the  future  ability  to  extract  oil 
and  the  path  of  future  demand  are  equally 
determined by circumstances aboveground.
Low  prices  discouraging  investment  is 
just  one  example  of  an  aboveground  issue 
that arguably can have just as much effect on 
the path of oil production as physical supply. 
Evolving  technology,  economic  growth,  fis-
cal  regimes,  geopolitics,  and  environmental 
preferences  and  regulations  are  all  above-
ground factors that will help determine the 
timing of peak oil production.
For example, some claim that the peak oil 
debate is moot simply because global energy 
demand will peak before global supply does. 
Subscribers to this philosophy cite economic 
slack,  efficiency  advancements,  and/or  con-
sumption  cutbacks  in  response  to  climate 
change as reasons why a peak in oil production 
will  be  driven  by  demand-side,  rather  than 
supply-side, constraints.
A  growing  school  of  thought  maintains 
that  U.S.  gasoline  consumption  peaked  in 
2007 as a result of firm pump prices, higher 
fuel efficiency, evolving transportation habits, 
and  the  increasing  role  of  renewable  fuels 
for transportation (see the figure). Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates (CERA), an energy 
consulting group with a well-known stance that 
world oil production will not peak in the near 
term, is a prominent subscriber to the theory 
that demand for gasoline in the United States 
has already peaked (Campoy 2008).
Sidebar 2
Aboveground factors and peaking demand
U.S. demand for motor gasoline
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become  depleted.9  The  incentive  for  innovation  and  investment  in  more  economically  and 
environmentally efficient energy production methods (hydrocarbon-based or renewable) will grow 
as the world exhausts conventional reserves.
The role of technology
As these descriptions of reserves demonstrate, a large gap exists between what is thought to 
be the earth’s total petroleum resource endowment and the portion of those resources that are 
considered recoverable. Technological advancement has played an essential role in narrowing that 
gap as innovation has allowed more usable oil to be produced in a more cost-effective manner.
For example, as oil is extracted, the pressure within the oil field diminishes and the water 
levels rise, contributing to a decline in the production rate. The decline can be delayed or reduced 
by injecting gas or water into the reservoir to increase the pressure or by heating the oil or injecting 
chemicals to reduce the viscosity of the oil. Today, these techniques of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
are commonly applied to aging fields to increase the amount of 
extractable oil (U.S. Department of Energy 2008).
Another  major  technological  innovation  for  oil  producers 
is  advanced  drilling  techniques  that  allow  more  precise  well 
exploration  and  development.  While  standard  vertical  drills 
allow producers to access a reservoir only from directly above, 
directional  or  horizontal  wells  enable  producers  to  reach 
underground reservoirs in a much more flexible, efficient manner (Feuillet-Midrier 2007, 89–90).
New technologies  have also allowed for  major advances in  companies’ ability to produce 
oil located beneath the ocean floor. Offshore extraction technologies have evolved in the past 
half-century from platforms reaching oil a few hundred feet below the water’s surface and a few 
thousand feet below the ocean floor to today’s major installations that are capable of drilling tens 
of thousands of feet. These advances have opened up new expanses of hydrocarbon reserves, 
including deep basins of deposits in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea and off the coast of 
Brazil and West Africa.
Advancements in recovery techniques, coupled with improvements in instruments geologists 
use to see what lies beneath the earth’s crust, have made previously unreachable (and undiscovered) 
deposits viable for production, thus leading to increased measurements of recoverable reserves. 
Many disbelievers in the theory that oil is nearing peak production argue that oil reserves will 
continue to grow over time as technological evolution makes production of seemingly out-of-
reach resources plausible. Maugeri (2009) points out that the world’s 2.3 trillion barrels of proved 
reserves (one trillion of which have already been consumed) account for only a segment of the 
earth’s original petroleum deposits. He argues that the reason just a portion of the earth’s original 
deposits are considered reserves is that easily accessible conventional oil has been abundant for 
most of the industry’s history, providing little incentive for significant investment in innovation of 
nonconventional oil production techniques. However, Maugeri notes that, as the “easy” oil is used 
up, technological advancement will ensue, and reserves will grow as resources from undiscovered 
and mature fields and nonconventional sources become viable.
But it may not be entirely realistic to make predictions about future oil supply on the assumption 
that some yet-to-be-created technology will establish access to what today are considered to be 
inaccessible and inefficient resources. Besides, a growing scarcity of conventional oil and the 
accompanying  high  oil  price  could  just  as  easily  justify  investment  in  alternative  energy  and 
conservation technology as advancements in oil recovery techniques.
9. The EIA estimates that unconventional liquid fuel production (including biofuels) will average 13.4 million barrels per 
day in 2030, up 30 percent from 2006 production, and account for more than 12 percent of total world liquids output 
(EIA 2009a, 21–22).
Nonconventional resources 
will likely play an increasingly 
important marginal supply role 
as reserves that are easier and 
cheaper to produce become depleted.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Government-controlled reserves
According to the EIA (2009b), in 2007 88 percent of the world’s proved reserves were owned 
by government-controlled oil companies—with over three-quarters of those reserves located in 
OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries—which are not subject to 
external auditing (see figure 4).10 This situation, skeptics claim, is reason to be cautious about 
accepting official reserve data as fact.
The most prominent example of disagreement about remaining supply is doubtless the case 
of Saudi Arabia, which controls what are reportedly the world’s largest conventional oil reserves. 
Some  experts  claim  that  the  Saudis  are  intentionally  overstating  the  country’s  reserves  to 
encourage short-term demand and deter conservation and investment in alternative energy; such 
investment would accelerate if peak oil were thought to be approaching and would eventually 
decrease the overall value of the Saudis’ reserves as the world diversifies away from oil.11 After all, 
OPEC members have an unusual incentive to overstate their reserves because the cartel’s export 
limits are based on member countries’ reserve estimates. Many analysts point to a period in the late 
1980s during which six of the eleven OPEC members reported large increases in reserve estimates, 
resulting in higher production quotas. If indeed OPEC reserve estimates are inflated, the world 
may actually be much closer to peak oil than the official numbers indicate.
On the other hand, there is also an argument that some of the world’s oil exporters, including 
Saudi Arabia, are instead under-reporting reserves, taking advantage of expected high future 
returns on oil and saving for future generations. OPEC, however, maintains that its reported 
reserves are accurate, claiming that “availability is not an issue” and asserting that the “world’s 
remaining resources of crude oil and natural gas liquids are clearly sufficient to meet demand 
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Figure 4
World proved crude oil reserves
Note: Data cover the period January 1980–January 2009 and include conventional crude oil and condensate reserves and, beginning in 2003, 
Canadian oil sands reserves.
Source: EIA; PennWell Corporation, Oil and Gas Journal, February 2009
10. Rogoff (2006) argues that investment in future oil production is greatly inhibited by the tendency of many oil-exporting 
countries to seek national control over oil production.
11. For  example,  Simmons  (2005)  claims  that  the  Saudis  have  been  deliberately  overstating  reserve  capabilities  for 
decades, maintaining that assessing the true quantity of reserves remaining in Saudi Arabia is the most significant issue 
in petroleum politics today. Petroleum geologist Colin Campbell (2004) asserts that OPEC countries are inflating their 
reported reserves for political reasons: to increase production quotas and/or make credit more accessible.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Saudi oil production has been rather erratic over time largely because the oil-rich country has 
historically functioned as a price stabilizer, increasing output when prices spike and cutting back   
if prices fall below a comfort zone. However, in recent years, despite the Saudis’ best efforts   
to influence the market, global prices have been exceptionally inelastic to supply announcements 
(to increase production when prices were at their peak and decrease when they dipped to lows in 
late 2008 and 2009). One could argue that OPEC’s poor pricing power during the oil price spike 
and the subsequent drop in 2007 and 2008 was in part a reflection of market participants’ distrust 
in the cartel’s (Saudi Arabia’s) ability to increase production enough to satisfy global oil demand.
The role of prices
During the five-year period from 2003 through 2007, global economic growth accelerated pre-
cipitously, led by the world’s increasingly energy-intensive developing countries (see figure 5); 
this rapid growth placed significant pressure on the global oil balance and contributed to an 
unprecedented price spike. From January 2007 through July 2008, the price of crude oil nearly 
tripled  (figure  6),  jolting  businesses  and  consumers  around  the  globe.  The  high  prices  were 
generally thought to be at least in part a result of tightening oil market fundamentals (energy 
demand outpacing supply); some, however, including OPEC, maintained that market fundamentals 
were healthy but that financial market speculation and movements in the dollar exchange rate 
were driving the run-up in prices (OPEC 2008).12
Regardless of the cause, the oil price spike had undeniable economic and social consequences 
across the globe. Hamilton (2009, 40) considers the 2007–08 oil price spike a critical factor that 
helped tip the United States into recession, finding that, “had there been no oil shock, we would 
have described the U.S. economy in 2007:Q4–2008:Q3 as growing slowly, but not in recession.” A 
wide range of estimates gauge the negative effect of a rising oil price on the global economy, with 
impacts on developing economies and oil-importing countries generally considered to be much 
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Figure 5
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Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2009
12. Hamilton (2009, 42) finds that, while speculative investment and low interest rates may have played a role in the price 
increase, “some degree of significant oil price appreciation during 2007–08 was an inevitable consequence of booming 
demand and stagnant production.”
13. For a review of estimates of the global economic implications of an increase in the price of oil, see Rogoff (2006).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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However, the price spike also had an upside: Consumers began to drive less and conserve more, 
while businesses and producers set out ambitious plans to invest in energy-saving technology 
and upgrade outdated equipment. Alternative (both nonconventional and renewable) sources 
of energy, which historically had been price prohibitive, emerged as attractive substitutes to 
$145 per barrel oil and gasoline above $4 a gallon. World oil demand plummeted as record 
prices and a worldwide economic slowdown forced consumers to cut back on their energy 
use. But just as talk of a new green era was entering the mainstream, crude prices retreated 
as quickly as they had come.
What role do prices ultimately serve in respect to long-term oil supply? Some economists 
would point out that, even absent any major policy initiatives, society should naturally move 
away from conventional oil as it approaches peak because rising prices will make substitutes 
more economically attractive. Hotelling (1931) explained that a rising oil price in anticipation 
of future supply declines will allow time for a transition to an alternative or nonconventional 
source of energy (or more conservation) before the cut-back becomes physically necessary. 
According to Hotelling’s rule, as long as information is transparent and markets are free to 
operate efficiently, since the price of oil includes the knowledge of future supply declines, 
preparation for peak oil will occur naturally because the market will establish an efficient 
allocation of oil over time. 14
However, as this article has described, information about the global oil market is far from 
being fully transparent. Current supply data are incomplete and often difficult to interpret, and the 
future paths of technological innovation and demand are difficult to foresee. Additionally, markets 
are not entirely free to incorporate expectations about the future. In reality, political leaders do not 
necessarily act in the most economically efficient manner but instead implement taxes or subsidies 
or act to maximize short-term profits at the expense of long-term outcomes.15 OPEC, for example, 

































Spot West Texas Intermediate oil price
Note: Data cover the period January 1946–March 2009.
Source: Wall Street Journal, monthly    
14. The rationale behind Hotelling’s rule is that anyone selling an exhaustible resource today is forfeiting the opportunity 
to sell it in a future market in which it might be more highly valued and therefore is incorporating a “scarcity rent” in 
the resource price today.
15. For a further discussion of Hotelling’s rule and its criticism, see Chermak and Patrick (2002) and Gaitan, Tol, and 
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distorting market pricing.16 In addition, Morgan Stanley (“Fuel subsidies” 2008) estimates that half 
the world’s population receives some form of fuel subsidy or price control. Although some of these 
policies were rolled back in attempts to shore up government ﬁ  scal positions during the price 
spike and subsequent economic collapse, government price intervention still cushions a signiﬁ  cant 
percentage of global oil demand from market incentives.
Looking ahead: Investing in future supply and understanding options
Low energy prices, generally thought to encourage economic growth, can also have longer-
term negative effects as they discourage efforts toward conservation and efﬁ  ciency and impede 
future production projects.17 Delayed investment spurred by soft energy prices could create an 
environment of lagging supply and price spikes.18 This risk is particularly apparent in the case of 
nonconventional and alternative resources, which tend to be relatively expensive to produce.19 
Fatih Birol, the chief economist at the IEA, estimates that about $100 billion in projects were either 
delayed or canceled in 2008 because of a combination of low oil prices and credit accessibility 
issues (IEA 2009).
The supply of energy as we have known it is in the process of transition. Today’s “easy” 
conventional oil that the world relies upon as a primary energy source is being depleted, and, 
regardless of the exact timing of peak oil production—be it this year or ﬁ  fty years down the road—
the world faces the challenge of adapting to a new model of energy supply. Although the peak oil 
literature tends to concentrate heavily on the scenarios of peaking world oil production, the true 
underlying issue is a fear that the transition from conventional oil to substitutes will be expensive 
and chaotic, leaving insufﬁ  cient time for supply substitution and adaptation.
This adaptation process—which involves using more renewable resources and conservation 
and developing new technology and processes to better access hydrocarbon deposits and more 
efﬁ  ciently extract and reﬁ  ne nonconventional sources—has already begun. But the road to the 
future energy balance—one with dwindling amounts of conventional oil—is far from mapped out. 
It is possible that the world’s vast endowments of hydrocarbon resources will be heavily relied 
upon to answer this growing call for substitutes for the conventional oil supply. However, there 
is also potential for an energy future largely diversiﬁ  ed away from hydrocarbon use. Most likely, 
future energy sources will be a combination of the two. Perhaps the peak oil literature would better 
serve society by being more solution-oriented, focusing on discovering the best way to transition to 
a world with less conventional oil rather than locking horns about discrepancies in terminology.
16. Kaufmann and Cleveland (2001) reason that the basic Hotelling model’s inability to describe the empirical relationship 
between oil prices and production justiﬁ  es a more active government role in the transition from oil.
17. CERA (2009) estimates that the decline in the price of oil could result in oil supply growth between 2009 and 2014 
being half that anticipated when prices were at their peak (7.6 million barrels per day [mbd] of the total potential future 
net growth of 14.5 mbd are considered to be at risk.)
18. Stevens (2008) explains why insufﬁ  cient investment by oil companies, rather than belowground physical supply factors, 
will likely be the driver behind an oil supply crunch.
19. For example, according to a report by the Canadian Energy Research Institute (McColl 2009), oil prices will have to 
average at least $70 per barrel (West Texas Intermediate) in order for capital investment in Canadian oil sands projects 
to continue.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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